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Water distribution systems are vulnerable to aqua-
terrorism (terrorism attacks on the water supply)
because they are extensive, relatively unprotected,
accessible, and often isolated (USEPA 2002, 2003a,
Grayman, 2002; Mays, 2004). An emerging activity
in the water security arena is developing methods to
minimize the public health and economic impacts of
a large-scale attack. An intense effort is currently
underway to improve analytical monitoring and
detection of biological, chemical, and radiological
contaminants in drinking water systems as part of
the overall effort to secure drinking water supplies
(USEPA, 2003b).
One approach for avoiding or mitigating the
impacts from contamination of a distribution system
is to perform monitoring in the context of an Early
Warning System (EWS). At present, federal
agencies, academic communities, and private
companies are working together to develop practical
and effective early warning systems. The goal of
an early warning system is to reliably identify low-
probability/high-impact contamination events in a
distribution system’s finished water, or in source
water, in time to permit an effective local response
that reduces or avoids entirely the adverse impacts
that may result from such an event. The core of an
EWS is a monitoring technology that, ideally, would
detect or screen for a variety of toxic substances or
infectious microorganisms (Brosnan 1999; USEPA
2002).
This article briefly reviews the essential elements
of an EWS, the relevant plans for developing and
implementing an EWS, and the current status and
potential for an EWS to ensure the security of drinking
water supplies and systems.
The Early Warning System Concept
Though early warning systems are frequently
equated with the monitoring instrumentation used to
detect contaminants in water, an effective EWS is,
in reality, an integrated system for deploying the
monitoring technology, analyzing and interpreting the
results, and utilizing the results to make decisions
that protect public health while minimizing
unnecessary concern and inconvenience within a
community. Ideally, an EWS should be an integral
part of the operation of a water system. It should be
able to be used to detect not only intentional
contamination, but also contaminants introduced
accidentally or as the result or natural occurrences
(i.e., dual use capabilities).
A recent American Water Works Association
Research Foundation (AwwaRF) study concluded
that an effective EWS should include the following
components (Grayman et al. 2001):
1. A mechanism for detecting the likely
presence of a contaminant in the finished
water;
2. A means for confirming the presence of the
contaminant, determining the nature of the
contamination event and the intensity
(concentration) of the contaminant in the
drinking water distribution system, and
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predicting when the contamination will affect
the end users;
3. Communication linkages for transferring
information related to the contamination;
4. Various mechanisms for responding to the
presence of the contamination in the finished
waters in order to mitigate its impacts on
water users; and
5. An institutional framework, generally
composed of a centralized unit that
coordinates the efforts associated with
managing the contamination event.
Characteristics of Early Warning
Systems
The following guidance is provided for utilities
that may consider implementing an EWS using
existing technologies, or technologies that will likely
enter the consumer market within the next few
years. As various technologies and systems are
considered, one may wish to evaluate how they
compare to the characteristics of an ideal EWS, as
described in a recent report by International Life
Science Institute (Brosnan 1999), as follows:
(1) exhibits warning in sufficient time for action, (2)
provides affordable cost, (3) requires low skill and
training, (4) covers all potential threats, (5) identifies
the source, (6) demonstrates sensitivity to quality
changes at regulatory levels, (7) gives minimal false
positive or negative responses, (8) exhibits
robustness, (9) allows remote operation, and (10)
functions year-round.
Currently, an EWS with all of these features does
not exist. However, there are some technologies that
can be used to build an EWS that can meet certain
core criteria: (1) provide rapid response, (2) screen
for a number of contaminants while maintaining
sufficient sensitivity, and (3) perform as automated
systems that allow for remote monitoring. Any
monitoring system that does not meet these
minimum criteria should not be considered an
effective EWS. Although an emphasis is placed on
these three features, the other issues discussed above
cannot be ignored in the design of an EWS. For
example, consideration should be given to the rate
of false positive/false negative results and method
sensitivity when interpreting the results. Furthermore,
system costs, sampling rate, and reliability should
also be included in the design of an EWS (Grayman
et al. 2001, 2004; USEPA 2002).
Design Considerations for an Early
Warning System
 An Early Warning System should be integrated
into the operation of a water system. Therefore, an
overall context for decision making relative to EWS
may be viewed as one of designing and operating
the system to minimize the risks associated with
degraded drinking water quality, under various cost
and technology constraints. Designing an EWS is
not simple because there are many issues and water
system characteristics that need to be considered.
These EWS design considerations are discussed in
various sources (Brosnan 1999; Clark et al. 2004;
Foran and Brosnan 2000; Grayman et al. 2001, 2004;
USEPA 2002; ) and are briefly summarized below:
Planning and Communication. Before initiating
an early warning monitoring program, the objectives
of the program should be defined clearly, and a plan
should be developed for the interpretation, use, and
reporting of monitoring results. Furthermore, the plan
should be developed in coordination with the water
utility, local and state health departments, emergency
response units, law enforcement agencies, and local
political leadership.
System Characterization. The first step in the
design of an EWS is to fully characterize the system
to be monitored such as the distribution system
infrastructure. The system should be characterized
with respect to access points, flow and demand
patterns, and pressure zones. If not already available,
a hydraulic model should be constructed. Finally,
system vulnerabilities should be identified and
characterized, preferably through a formal
vulnerability assessment as described previously by
EPA (USEPA 2002). An understanding of each of
these characteristics provides the backbone for the
proper design and development of an EWS. In
addition, system characterization should consider both
water demand and water usage patterns.
Target Contaminants. An ideal EWS should be
capable of monitoring for all potential contaminants.
However, even the most complex array of monitoring
equipment cannot detect the entire spectrum of
agents that could pose a threat to public health via
contaminated water. Thus, the design of an EWS
should focus on contaminants that are thought to
pose the most serious threat. Many factors may go
into this assessment, including: the concentration of
a particular contaminant that is necessary to cause
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harm, the availability and accessibility of a
contaminant, the persistence and stability of a
contaminant in an aqueous environment, and the
difficulty associated with detecting a contaminant in
the water. System vulnerabilities and the ability of
existing treatment barriers to remove or neutralize
specific contaminants should also be considered in
the threat assessment.
A challenge in designing an effective EWS is
striking a balance between the screening function
of the system (i.e., the ability to detect a wide range
of contaminants) and specificity (i.e., the ability to
positively identify and quantify a specific
contaminant). One approach to resolving these
conflicting objectives is through tiered monitoring.
In a tiered approach with two stages, the first stage
might provide a continuous, real-time screen for a
range of contaminants that could pose a threat to
public health, utilizing a broad-based screening
technology such as assays designed to detect
changes in toxicity. A positive result from the first
stage would trigger confirmatory analysis using more
specific and sensitive techniques, and a positive result
from the confirmatory analysis would trigger a
response action. Additional discussions of tiered
monitoring are presented elsewhere (Daughton
2001). A common misconception is that the screening
stage alone of a monitoring system constitutes an
EWS. However, a properly designed EWS should
include all elements of a monitoring program
necessary to inform the decision making of officials
responsible for public health. Thus, confirmatory
analyses used to verify a positive result from a
screening analysis, and the hydraulic modeling or
analysis that determines the sampling locations, should
be integrated into the overall design of the EWS.
EWS Technology Selection. Once target
contaminants for the EWS have been identified, it is
necessary to select a monitoring technology for the
particular contaminant or class of contaminants, if
one that meets the core requirements of an EWS
exists. The monitoring technology should be capable
of dealing with complex water matrices. This may
require an extraction step to remove the material
from the water matrix and/or a concentration step
to enhance detection and quantification. Although
techniques for isolating, concentrating, and purifying
microbial and chemical substances have been
developed for many laboratory methods, they may
not necessarily be transferable to field deployable
monitoring devices. The technology considered for
use in an EWS should be evaluated to ensure that
all steps of the methodology perform correctly and
can detect the target contaminant(s) without
excessive interference.
Identifying a field deployable technology with an
acceptable methodology is only the first step.
Performance of the monitoring technology must also
be adequate to meet the data quality objectives of
the monitoring program. These data quality objectives
should be defined during the design of the EWS and
include: specificity, sensitivity, accuracy, precision,
and recovery, as well as rates of false positives and
negatives. If the monitoring technology cannot meet
the data quality objectives, then another technology
should be selected. If no technology can be identified
that meets the objectives, then either the EWS should
not be implemented, or the data quality objectives
will need to be revised. If the later approach is taken,
it will be necessary to modify the manner in which
the results are used to be consistent with revised
data quality objectives.
Alarm Levels and Response. Once the EWS
technology has been identified, it is necessary to
identify the concentrations at which the agents pose
a threat to human health so that alarms can be
triggered at appropriate levels. The basis for setting
alarm levels will depend on the capability of the EWS
employed. It should also be noted that the alarm
should be triggered by a combination of events, not
a single detection, which may be a false positive.
Many responses are possible when an early warning
monitoring system triggers an alarm. Responses may
include modification to the drinking water system
(e.g., shutdown, addition of disinfectants, etc.),
notification (e.g., boil water advisory) either to the
general public or to target communities or
subpopulations, additional data gathering or
monitoring, follow-on surveillance and epidemiologic
studies, no action, or some combination of these.
The type of response will be dependent on the nature
of both the threat to and the nature of the drinking
water system, including the population it serves.
Where an EWS is in place, credibility of the threat
may be judged by the performance of the EWS itself,
when it is capable of detecting the contaminants
included in the threat. Additionally, law enforcement
representatives may provide insight into the
credibility of the threat (Foran and Brosnan 2002).
If a false alarm leads to a decision to issue a notice
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to the public to stop using the water, public health as
well as public confidence could be impacted.
Fate and Transport of Pathogens and
Chemicals. Chemical and microbial agents can
behave in a variety of ways as they migrate through
a water system. Environmental conditions, the
presence of oxidants or other treatment chemicals,
and the hydraulic characteristics of the system will
affect the concentration and characteristics of these
agents. If information is available on agent
characteristics that affect their fate and transport, it
should be factored into the design of an EWS. For
example, if a target agent is known to chemically
degrade at a certain rate in the presence of free
chlorine, it may be possible to use a hydraulic/water
quality model of the distribution system to predict
the concentration profile through the system. This
information, in turn, can be used to design the EWS
and select optimal locations for sensors.
Sensor Location and Density. The location and
density of sensors in an EWS is dictated by the results
of the system characterization, vulnerability
assessment, threat analysis, and usage
considerations. The size, complexity, and dynamic
nature of distribution systems complicate the
selection of sensor locations. Proper characterization
of the distribution system, including usage patterns,
and the location of critical system nodes (e.g.,
hospitals, law enforcement and emergency response
agencies, government facilities, etc.) is necessary
to design an effective monitoring network. Due to
their complexity and dynamic nature, it may be
beneficial to develop a hydraulic model of the system
to assist in the placement of sensors (see the paper
by Uber et al, in this issue). Other methods are
reported in the literature for optimal placement of
monitoring stations (Lee and Deininger 1992; Uber
et al. 2004). However, even if sensors can be
optimally located within a distribution system, there
may not be sufficient time to prevent exposure of a
portion of the public to the contaminated water. At
best, monitoring conducted within the distribution
system will provide time to limit exposure, isolate
the contaminated water, and initiate mitigation/
remediation actions.
Data Management, Interpretation, and
Reduction. The computer system infrastructure
of a medium to large water utility typically includes
its financial system, Human Resource (HR)
system, Laboratory Information Management
System (LIMS), Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) system, Computerized
Maintenance Management System (CMMS), etc.
The financial, HR, LIMS, and CMMS systems
are considered to be part of the utility’s
Information Technology (IT) infrastructure run by
a utility or local government IT group on a daily
8-10 hour schedule. Cyber attacks to the IT
infrastructure (i.e., a computer-to-computer attack
that undermines the confidentiality, integrity, or
availability of a computer or the information it
stores) may cause significant financial damage
and disruption of the utility’s internal operations,
but they are not expected to cause immediate
water supply disruptions. However, cyber attacks
on the SCADA system could have an immediate
detrimental impact on the water supply (Panguluri
et al. 2004)
One of the challenges of a continuous, real-
time monitoring system is management of the large
amounts of data that are generated. Use of data
acquisition software and a central data
management center is critical. This will require
that individual sensors deployed in the system be
equipped with transmitters, modems, direct wire,
or some other means to communicate the data to
the acquisition and management systems.
Furthermore, the data management system should
be capable of performing some level of data
analysis and trending in order to assess whether
or not an alarm level has been exceeded. The use
of “smart” systems that evaluate trends and can
distinguish between genuine excursions and noise
could minimize the rate of false alarms.
A decision will also have to be made regarding
the action that is taken when the data management
system detects an excursion above the alarm
level. At a minimum, the system should notify
operators, public health agencies, and/or
emergency response officials. If possible,
redundant communication should be used (e.g.,
notifying multiple individuals through multiple
routes such as page and fax). In some cases, it
may be appropriate to program the data
management system to initiate preliminary
response actions, such as closing valves or
collecting additional samples. However, these
initial responses should be considered simple
precautionary measures, and public officials should
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make judgments regarding decisive response
actions.
Existing and Emerging Monitoring
Technologies
While laboratory technology exists to measure a
wide range of substances in the environment, the
analytical capabilities of monitors as part of an EWS
are more limited. Currently available water quality
monitors include physical, chemical, radiological, and
microbiological analysis as well as bio-monitoring
systems that use living organisms as broad spectrum
indicators of changes in water quality. The use of
biosensors has to date been limited to chlorine/
chloramines-free source waters. Efforts are
underway to adapt biosensors so that they can be
employed in public water supply distribution systems.
References for commercially available rapid or on-
line monitoring techniques for the water industry
include AwwaRF and CRS PROAQUA 2002; Frey
et al. 2000; Grayman et al. 2001.
Some of the more common physical and chemical
monitoring methods proposed for use in EWS include
simple probes (e.g., turbidity, pH, temperature, odor,
conductivity, dissolved oxygen, chlorophyll); relatively
simple batch tests (e.g., immunoassays for
herbicides), and more advanced monitoring for
chemicals (e.g., fluorescence for oils,
chromatography for oil and petroleum constituents,
volatile organic chemicals and phenols). Some of
the primary contaminant surrogates include turbidity,
dissolved oxygen, odor, conductivity, and general
measures of organic carbon content (e.g., oxidant
demand, total organic carbon). However, the
parameters that are easily and inexpensively
monitored via on-line probes (e. g., temperature,
conductivity, pH) provide limited capability for
detection of specific contaminants of security
concern. Advanced monitors are more expensive
and require more maintenance and expertise, but
have better capabilities for these applications. Based
on recent research in the food and chemical industry,
electronic odor sensing technologies (“electronic
noses”) may be available in the future for use in the
analysis of water (Grayman. et al. 2001).
Conventional culture methods for detecting
microbial contaminants require a relatively long time
period (hours or days) and many tests are specific
for a single species or class of organism. As such,
these analyses cannot be used as part of an EWS.
However, numerous significant recent advances in
microbial monitoring and related technology offer
increased sensitivity, specificity and/or more rapid
analysis, including DNA microchip arrays, rapid
DNA probes and PCR, rapid hand-held
immunoassays, cytometry, laser scanning, laser
fingerprinting, optical technologies, and luminescence
(e.g., bio- and chemi-luminescence) (Foran and
Brosnan 2000; Grayman et al. 2001; Lee and
Deninger 1999; Rose and Grimes 2001; States et al.
2004; Venter 2000 ).  More recently, concentration
of water samples by ultra filtration followed by PCR
is carried out by Vince Hall at CDC and others
(Gelting 2004).  Most of these methods are still being
developed or were only recently introduced. Their
use, however, is likely to increase in the future.
An example of a promising approach for
continuous monitoring of water for multiple pathogens
is the Automated Pathogen Detection System
(APDS) being developed by the Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory. This system traps
analytes of interest onto antibodies conjactaed to
beads with subsequent identification through
fluorescence. While this immune separation assay
has been primarily designed for aerosol monitoring,
it may be adaptable to pathogen detection in water
supplies if the aerosol monitor is replaced with a
large volume water concentration system.
In general, while prototype systems for monitoring
airborne contamination are in use at various locations
around the country, systems for detecting microbial
pathogens in drinking waters supplies lag behind.
Research and Development Needs
A number of ongoing research projects of
AwwaRF and the Water Environment Research
Foundation are investigating rapid and on-line
monitoring technologies. Many of the advances in
monitoring technologies occur from research in other
scientific fields (e.g., the food and beverages
industry, analytical chemistry, the sensor industry,
and the military), including biosensor and biochip
technology, fiber optics, genetically-engineered
organisms, rapid immunoassays, microelectronics,
and others. Several U.S. government organizations,
including the USEPA and the U.S. Army’s Joint
Service Agent Water Monitor Program, are
conducting research on rapid and/or on line
monitoring systems for a variety of contaminants.
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A number of monitoring technologies and products
are available that could potentially serve as a core
component of an EWS, and a number of suppliers
of conventional monitoring systems have begun to
advertise them as water security monitoring systems
in the wake of terrorist concerns. However, the
performance of these systems has not been fully or
independently characterized in most cases. Without
basic performance information (e.g., detection limits,
sensitivity, selectivity, rate of false positives and false
negatives), it will be difficult to interpret monitoring
results and derive the information necessary to make
appropriate public health decisions.
As promising technologies continue to be
developed and brought into the commercial market,
there is a need for a mechanism, including field
evaluation and testing sites, to verify system
performance. Ideally, such testing should be
conducted according to a standard protocol by an
independent third party, and the subject technology
should be evaluated against standardized methods,
if available. This would provide water utilities with
the data necessary to make informed decisions
regarding the implementation of a specific technology
in an EWS. EPA has established the Environmental
Technology Verification (ETV) Program to provide
independent third party testing of environmental
monitoring and treatment technologies. Under the
Advanced Monitoring Systems Center of ETV,
monitoring technologies with the potential to serve
as an EWS in water systems will be evaluated, and
the reports will be made available to the public.
Conclusions
An early warning system must reliably identify
low-probability/high-impact contamination events in
distribution systems or source water in time to allow
for an effective response. The type of response and
the method of communication of the response will
depend on the nature of the threat, the capabilities
of the EWS itself, and on the characteristics of the
affected population. Especially critical is the
development of an emergency preparedness plan
that guides the responses associated with a signal
from the EWS and the communication of actions
based on the responses (Foran and Brosnan 2000).
The resources necessary for the development,
installation, operation, and maintenance of an EWS
will be substantial; therefore, virtually all of the
decisions regarding the EWS must be made at the
local or regional level.
Implementation of some types of existing
monitoring technology will result in a false sense of
security since there is no assurance that they are
capable of meeting the monitoring objectives. In
addition, these systems could result in false alarms
that would undermine the effectiveness of a
monitoring program and result in a needless
expenditure of resources to follow-up on the false
positive and false negative results (USEPA 2002).
To ensure the full protection of drinking water, a
technology-based early warning monitoring system
should be just one component of a comprehensive
program to protect the public from the threat of
intentional contamination. The program must also
include physical, social, and economic steps to
prevent the problem, as well as public health
monitoring to ensure that early detection of disease
will occur if a monitoring system or other steps fail
(Brosnan 1999; Foran and Brosnan 2002; USEPA
2002).
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